Foundations of Timed-Release Cryptography

HORIZON.1.1HORIZON-ERCID: 101043243
EC Contribution
€18,977
Consortium Size
2 orgs
Summary

Cryptography has repeatedly revolutionized modern technology via its ""easy-or-infeasible"" design paradigm, classifying computations as either ""easy"" or ""infeasible"". Nowadays, however, this foundational paradigm is insufficient for a host of rapidly evolving applications, and a fine-grained accounting of sequential timing guarantees is urgently needed. This has recently led to substantial interest in the classic yet insufficiently-explored vision of timed-release cryptography, enabling cryptographic systems to rely on such guarantees realistically. Despite the significant attention, the vision of timed-release cryptography is still alarmingly far, and the landscape of our current knowledge must rapidly change to facilitate its deployment: Timed-release cryptography suffers from an extreme lack of candidate schemes, and the security of its main candidates is provided directly by assumption (with essentially no supporting evidence other than the lack of successful ""speed-up"" attacks).This proposal aims to establish robust foundations for timed-release cryptography by obtaining an in-depth understanding of the computational landscape, building blocks, and schemes required for realizing its premise. Specifically, I plan to direct our effort towards addressing the following three fundamental objectives, which span a broad and interdisciplinary flavor of research directions: (1) Explore sources of computational hardness that enable to base timed-release cryptography on the hardness of well-studied problems, (2) identify the extents to which timed-release primitive building blocks require cryptographic structure and can be utilized in designing more complex schemes, and (3) construct concrete such schemes offering a wide range of security and functionality guarantees. I strongly believe that substantial progress towards our objectives will enable us to realize the premise of timed-release cryptography, and will have a long-lasting impact on cryptography.""

Consortium (2)

Project Results (10)

Source: CORDIS, the EU research results database.

Publications (8)
Tighter Concrete Security for the Simplest OT
IACR Communications in Cryptology· 2025DOI
Iftach Haitner, Gil Segev
An Explicit High-Moment Forking Lemma and its Applications to the Concrete Security of Multi-Signatures
IACR Communications in Cryptology· 2024DOI
Gil Segev, Liat Shapira
Asynchronous Agreement on a Core Set in Constant Expected Time and More Efficient Asynchronous VSS and MPC
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Theory of Cryptography· 2024DOI
Ittai Abraham, Gilad Ashsarov, Arpita Patra, Gilad Stern
From One-Time to Two-Round Reusable Multi-signatures Without Nested Forking
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Theory of Cryptography· 2024DOI
Lior Rotem, Gil Segev, Eylon Yogev
Is ML-Based Cryptanalysis Inherently Limited? Simulating Cryptographic Adversaries via Gradient-Based Methods
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2024· 2024DOI
Avital Shafran, Eran Malach, Thomas Ristenpart, Gil Segev, Stefano Tessaro
Tighter Security for Schnorr Identification and Signatures: A High-Moment Forking Lemma for $$\varvec{\Sigma }$$-Protocols
Journal of Cryptology· 2024DOI
Lior Rotem, Gil Segev
Non-malleable Vector Commitments via Local Equivocability
Journal of Cryptology· 2023DOI
Lior Rotem, Gil Segev
Rogue-Instance Security for Batch Knowledge Proofs
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Theory of Cryptography· 2023DOI
Gil Segev, Amit Sharabi, Eylon Yogev
Deliverables (1)
Documents, reports
Other Results (1)
Periodic Reporting for period 1 - FTRC (Foundations of Timed-Release Cryptography)